Introduction
As is well known, the net effects of hiring and firing regulation on unemployment and employment cannot be unambiguously deduced from theory (see, e.g., Bertola 1990) . Given the ambiguity of theoretical models, the direction and magnitude of the impact of hiring and firing regulations have to be resolved empirically. Although many empirical studies have analyzed their effects over the F o r P e e r R e v i e w 2 past years, the evidence so far is mixed. 1 In recent surveys of the empirical literature, the OECD (2004a, p. 80), Layard et al. (2005, p . XVII) and Bassanini and Duval (2006, p. 89) conclude that these studies do not settle the matter. This paper attempts to gain new insights by using a subjective indicator of the strictness of hiring and firing regulation. By contrast, almost all previous studies have used so-called objective indicators. These indicators have their limitations though. Hiring and firing regulations comprise a large number of statute laws, administrative orders and court decisions. It is very hard to develop an objective indicator that correctly reflects the strictness of all of these rules and regulations. Even if it would be possible to correctly measure the de jure strictness of hiring and firing regulations, objective indicators are unable to capture the de facto strictness of these regulations, which also depends on informal norms and the way the formal rules are enforced. The de facto strictness may vary through time, for example because of changes in the manner how courts and public administrations apply a given set of laws and regulations. Furthermore, objective indicators are unable to measure how employers judge the strictness of a given set of hiring and firing regulations. 1 See, e.g., Lazear (1990) , Addison and Grosso (1996) , Scarpetta (1996) , Elmeskov et al. (1998 ), International Monetary Fund (2003 , Heckman and Pagés (2004) , OECD (2004a) , Baker et al. (2005) , Nickell et al. (2005) , Bassanini and Duval (2006) . Section 2 describes the data set and the empirical strategy, particularly discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the survey data. Section 3 presents and interprets the regression results. Section 4 concludes.
Data
To measure the strictness of hiring and firing regulation, this paper uses results from the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Surveys (EOS), which are carried out annually in a large number of countries to determine the international competitiveness of the relevant economies. The respondents are a company's CEO or a member of its senior management. In each country approximately 60 to 70 executives are interviewed. The industry structure of the companies questioned corresponds largely to the industry structure of the relevant economy (excluding the agricultural sector). Also, care is taken to question companies of various size categories and types (e.g., private and state-owned, domestically oriented and internationally active enterprises). The typical EOS question asks participants to indicate on a numerical scale which of the two statements specified in each case they favor. After the questioning, arithmetic means for each question are calculated from the answers for each country. The Box contains the questions on hiring and firing regulation used in the following analysis. The World Economic Forum used different scales in the years before 1997. For the purpose of our analysis, we converted all pre-1997 answers to the 1-to-7 scale used in the more recent surveys. The period covered by our empirical analysis is 1992 to 2002. In the years prior to 1992, the respective questions were phrased very differently. For example, in 1991 the EOS statement read: "Flexibility of management to adjust employment levels during difficult periods: 0 = low, 100 = high" (World Economic Forum and Institute for Management Development 1991). Thus the question did not explicitly refer to hiring and firing regulations. In 1990 the EOS statement read: "Flexibility of enterprises to adjust employment and compensation levels to economic realities: 0 = not at all, to 100 = a great deal" (World Economic Forum and Institute for Management Development 1990). Similarly, in the years 1984 to 1987 and in 1989 (there was no survey in 1988), the EOS statement read: "Flexibility of enterprises to adjust job security and compensation standards to economic realities: 0 = none at all, to 100 = a great deal" (EMF Foundation -The World Economic Forum 1984 Forum , 1985 Forum , 1986 World Economic Forum 1987; World Economic Forum and Institute for Management Development 1989) . Thus before 1991, the questions did not exclusively refer to adjustments in employment or job security (and thus at least implicitly to hiring and firing regulations) but also to wage adjustments. Because of these substantial differences, we excluded the answers to the pre-1992 questions from our data set. The questions from the Executive Opinion Surveys 1992 to 2002 explicitly refer to hiring and firing regulations and are all phrased in a similar way (see Box). There are some slight variations but these are only refinements of style to make the questions more precise. Thus the answers to all 11 questions can be used simultaneously. -Second, the questions are phrased objectively and, at the same time, permit a better coverage of the various facets of hiring and firing regulations than hard data. For example, a country's dismissal regulations comprise a large number of legal standards, administrative orders and court decisions. If only the duration of the statutory notice period and the amount of the severance payment for a worker with ten years' length of service are used as indicators, as was the case with Lazear (1990) , the degree of strictness of hiring and firing regulations is not completely and correctly measured. The OECD's (1999 OECD's ( , 2004a ) employment protection legislation (EPL) indicator, which has been used in almost all recent studies, is much more sophisticated than Lazear's (1990) indicator. Still, although the OECD's EPL indicator does an excellent job in measuring the de jure strictness of hiring and firing regulations, it is unable to capture their de facto strictness. As already pointed out, the de facto strictness also depends on the degree of enforcement of the law and on informal norms. For instance, in some countries, like France, advance notice before dismissal given orally is more important than the length of the notice period stated in the law. Informal norms and the degree of enforcement of the law cannot be captured at all by hard data. By contrast, the answers to the EOS questions appear to be well suited to capture the de facto strictness of hiring and firing regulations.
-Third, as the respondents decide on the recruitment and dismissal of workers, their answers are likely to reflect the relevance of the strictness of hiring and firing regulations to the performance of the labor market. In fact, the answers are likely to reflect this relevance better than objective (Cooke 1997 , Görg 2005 .
Of course, potential drawbacks also have to be considered in connection with the use of the Executive Opinion Surveys. One potential drawback is that the answers may be distorted by the state of the business cycle prevailing at the time of the questioning. For example, the managers of a country might judge the dismissal protection regulations favorably during a boom when they do not have to lay off many workers. In a subsequent recession, when they do have to substantially reduce staff, they might feel restricted by those regulations. Thus, they might then judge them less favorably, although the regulations have not been altered in the meantime. However, a closer look at the data suggests that the business cycle does not affect the EOS scores. A first indication is that the correlation coefficient between the variable output gap and the EOS-based variable hiring and firing regulation, at -0.21, is low and negative, not positive as could be expected if the EOS scores would be affected by the business cycle in the way described previously. Furthermore, If we do not control for unobserved country effects but just for the level of economic development, the coefficient on output gap is statistically significant at the 1% level [regression (4)]. However, once again, it has a negative algebraic sign, contradicting the hypothesis that booms (recessions) lead to higher (lower) EOS scores. All in all, we can safely reject this hypothesis.
A second potential drawback of the EOS data is that each respondent could use his own yardstick when answering the questions. For example, on the 1-to-7 scale, an item marked 7 by one person may only be marked 5 by another. This is a concern particularly because only 60 to 70 managers were interviewed in each country. However, in the planning, implementation and analysis of the surveys, care was taken to ensure the use of a uniform yardstick. For one, the respondents were provided with a written explanation of the answering scale. Also, the answers were examined for robustness and consistency using various methods. In one of these checks, half of the responses in each country were randomly dropped from the sample. As the national EOS scores remained stable in the process, they have obviously not been distorted by individual peculiarities in responding (Cornelius and Warner 2000, p. 94; Cornelius and McArthur 2002, pp. 169-173; Blanke et al. 2003, pp. 372-375) . 4 The Hausman test indicates that the random effects estimates may be biased (Table 1) . Another concern is that there may be a systematic bias among respondents at the national level. For example, respondents in a country might have a similar biased assessment of the strictness of hiring and firing regulation if this topic has recently been discussed extensively and with a certain flavor in the press. Also, the questions may be interpreted differently in different countries. For these reasons, the survey results may not accurately reflect differences in national hiring and firing regulation. The authors of the Executive Opinion Surveys tried to avoid this problem by providing all respondents with a written explanation of the answering scale and by asking them to think in world terms rather than in national terms.
In order to check whether a "perception bias" exists, we compare the national EOS scores with related hard data. As an objective indicator, we use the OECD's (2004a) employment protection legislation (EPL) indicator. This indicator measures the strictness of protection against individual dismissals for workers with regular contracts and the strictness of regulation of temporary employment (fixed-term contracts, temporary work agency employment).
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As mentioned previously, it solely uses objective data. For example, to measure the strictness of protection against individual dismissal, it takes into account, inter alia, the length of the notice period and the amount of severance pay at different lengths of tenure. To measure the strictness of regulation of temporary employment, it takes into account, inter alia, the maximum number and the maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts as well as the maximum cumulated duration of temporary work agency contracts. The OECD converted these measures into cardinal scores that were normalized to range from 0 to 6, with higher scores representing stricter regulation. In 5 A second version of the EPL indicator additionally includes specific requirements for collective dismissals. However, data for this broader indicator are only available since the late 1990s. This does not pose a major problem, though, as specific requirements for collective dismissals do not play a major role. Indeed, as the OECD (2004a, p. 72) has demonstrated, taking account of these specific requirements in the overall measure of EPL strictness does not affect cross-country comparisons much. calculating the summary indicator of EPL strictness, it assigned the same weight to the regulation covering regular and temporary contracts.
As hiring and firing regulations are usually reformed only rarely, most of the variation results from differences across countries rather than from changes through time. Thus we first calculate country averages for the EPL indicator and the EOS scores. Figure 1 plots the EPL indicator on the horizontal axis and the survey results on the vertical axis. The graph shows a strong relationship between the two variables. Indeed, the correlation coefficient for these country averages is -0.84. Furthermore, Figure 2 illustrates that changes in hiring and firing regulation that have occurred in some countries during our period of investigation are reflected not only in the EPL scores but in the EOS scores as well. For example, in 1994 Spain relaxed procedural requirements for dismissals for economic reasons, shortened notice periods, permitted temporary work agencies and tightened rules governing renewals of fixed-term contracts. As a result, not only did its EPL score drop from 3.8 in 1993 to 3.1 in 1994, in addition Spain's EOS score increased from 2.32 in 1993 to 2.56 in 1994. In 1995, its EOS score increased further to 2.76, which is plausible because the Executive Opinion Belgium is a similar case in point. In 1997 it reduced restrictions on temporary work agencies and made fixed-term contracts renewable. As a result, Belgium's EPL score fell from 3.2 in 1996 to 2.2 in 1997. Concurrently, its EOS score increased from 2.63 in 1996 to 3.00 in 1997 and 3.26 in 1998.
The case of New Zealand also illustrates that substantial changes in the strictness of hiring and To measure the performance of the labor market, we use not only the overall rates of unemployment and employment but also unemployment and employment rates relating to women, youths and the low skilled. Thus we analyze not only whether the strictness of hiring and firing regulation affects the general situation on the labor market but also whether it affects three demographic groups that usually have above-average unemployment rates.
We control for the impact of most other labor market institutions that have been considered in the recent literature. As previous empirical studies have shown, certain labor market institutions appear to have a considerable impact on the performance of the labor market (see footnote 1). By using adequate controls, we try to make sure as far as possible that the coefficients on flexible hiring and firing regulation are not biased due to omitted variables. To date, the OECD has undertaken the most extensive effort to quantify labor market institutions and has developed the best indicators.
Therefore, we use these data, although they are available for only 19 industrial countries (see We use the output gap to control for the state of the business cycle. Additionally, we use log income per capita to account for the effects of differences in the level of economic development, e.g., with respect to the labor force participation of women. In the regressions to explain the youth employment rate, we also employ the tertiary enrollment rate. This variable is meant to account for varying academic education frequencies, which are likely to affect youth employment.
Finally, we control for unobserved country effects by using country-specific fixed effects. The fixed effects regressions, presented in the upper parts of Tables 2 and 3, are the baselines for our empirical estimates.
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To check whether other methodologies yield similar results, the lower parts of both tables present the coefficients on our variable of interest from FGLS regressions with countryspecific random effects and from pooled OLS regressions, respectively. In both cases, the control variables are the same as the ones used for the fixed effects regressions presented in the upper part of the tables. 8 We prefer the fixed effects model to the random effects model because in 5 out of 8 regressions, the Hausman test indicates that the random effects estimates may be biased (Tables 2   and 3 ). We prefer the fixed effects model to the pooled OLS model because, first, the estimates from the latter model are likely to be biased as well in these five cases, and, second, because the 7 While controlling for the effects of most other major labor market institutions, the business cycle, the level of economic development and unobserved country effects goes a long way to avoid omitted variables bias, endogeneity still may be a problem for estimation because changes in unemployment and employment rates may lead to changes in the (perceived) strictness of hiring and firing regulation. Unfortunately, due to a lack of instruments we are unable to directly address this reverse causality problem. (This is in line with the previous literature, which does not use instruments either.) However, given the results presented in Table 1 , it is unlikely that reverse causality is relevant in our case. (Unemployment and employment rates are strongly correlated with the output gap.) 8 To save space, the estimates for the controls from the random effects FGLS and the pooled OLS regressions are not presented in Tables 2 and 3 . 
Results
Tables 2 and 3 present our multivariate regressions to explain unemployment and employment rates, respectively. Our results for the control variables largely accord with those obtained in many earlier studies. For example, in line with most previous studies we find that an increase in the tax wedge is likely to both raise unemployment and lower the employment level.
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Furthermore, we find that generous unemployment benefit schemes appear to increase unemployment. This is also in line with most recent studies. We now turn to the results for our variable of interest. Indeed, the key finding of our empirical investigation is that hiring and firing regulation appears to have a statistically significant and robust effect on labor market performance. The coefficient on flexible hiring and firing regulation is statistically significant in all fixed effects regressions, in seven out of eight random effects regressions and in four out of eight pooled OLS regressions. According to our estimates, more flexible hiring and firing regulation is associated with lower unemployment among the total labor force as well as among female, young and low-skilled workers (Table 2) . Similarly, it is associated 9 We also checked the robustness of our results by dropping the control variables from our baseline specifications one at a time. In these checks (results not reported here), the coefficient on our variable of interest remained very similar.
10 Important studies on the effects of labor taxes include, e.g., Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Prescott (2004) . with a higher level of employment among the overall working-age population as well as among women, youths and the low-skilled (Table 3) . 12 Our estimates suggest that liberalizing hiring and firing regulation would have a notable, though generally modest, pay-off in terms of lower unemployment and higher employment. For example, according to the Executive Opinion Surveys, France had one of the strictest hiring and firing regulation in our sample of 19 industrial countries. During the period under review, its EOS score averaged 2.84. By contrast, Switzerland had one of the most flexible hiring and firing regulation. Its EOS score averaged 5.31. Switzerland also had substantially lower unemployment rates as well as substantially higher employment rates, both among the total population and among each of the three demographic groups. According to our fixed effects estimates, if hiring and firing regulation in France had been as flexible as in Switzerland, the French unemployment rate would have been 1.1 percentage points lower among the total labor force, 1.6 percentage points lower among women, 2.1 percentage points lower among young people and 1.7 percentage points lower among the low skilled, ceteris paribus. Additionally, France's employment rate would have been 1.1 percentage points higher both among the total working-age population and among women, 1.5 percentage points higher among young people and 2.1 percentage points higher among low-skilled workers, ceteris paribus. Of course, these figures should be interpreted with some caution. However, they illustrate the magnitude of the effects.
According to our results, flexible hiring and firing regulations are favorable for workers, particularly for female, young and low-skilled workers. If the regulations relating to fixed-term 12 As mentioned in section 1, the evidence from previous empirical studies, which almost exclusively use objective indicators, so far is mixed. By contrast, our results are less ambiguous. The main reason for this difference may be that our survey-based indicator is more likely than objective indicators to correctly capture the de facto strictness of hiring and firing regulations and their relevance to the performance of the labor market (see section 2). contracts and temporary work agencies are flexible, these workers seem more often to have an opportunity to find a job via temporary employment contracts and thus to establish themselves in working life. If dismissal regulations are not too restrictive, employers seem to be more inclined to hire women, young people and low-skilled workers for an indefinite period, as they are in a position to rapidly dismiss them if the profitability of their employment proves to be inadequate or if the business situation deteriorates. In the end, these workers benefit from this planning scope of employers.
Our results corroborate those theoretical models according to which high costs of hiring and firing impair the employment situation. For example, extending Bertola's (1990) well-know model, Risager and Sørensen (1997) have shown that an increase in hiring and firing costs ceteris paribus reduces the return on capital, lowering investment, labor demand and employment. As our results indicate that strict hiring and firing rules are likely to have an especially adverse impact on women, young people and low-skilled workers, they particularly corroborate Lindbeck and Snower's (1988) insider-outsider theory, according to which these kind of rules deteriorate the employment opportunities of these groups in particular.
Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence of the effects of hiring and firing regulations on unemployment and employment rates. In contrast to the previous literature, which almost exclusively relies on hard data, we use the results of surveys among senior business executives to measure the strictness of these kind of regulations. The survey data are more likely than objective indicators to correctly capture their de facto strictness and their relevance to the performance of the labor market.
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Appendix B. Definitions and sources of variables
Log income per capita: The natural logarithm of gross national income divided by midyear population, converted into current international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Unemployment rate: Unemployed as a percentage of the civilian labor force (standardized rates).
Source: OECD (2005c).
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